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MATHIS v. UNITED STATES, 391 U.S. 1 (1968)
convict him of knowingly filing false tax returns. The
comt of appeals affinned the conviction.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Pursuant to its
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966),
the Court held that when an individual is in govern1nent custody and interrogated on n1atters that n1ay
incriminate hhn, he inust be warned beforehand of his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Any
information obtained, absent these wa111ll1gs, must be
excluded from trial. The Court's decision therefore
extended the Miranda warning require1nent in tWo in1portant ways. First, it was made clear that tax investigations ,of people in government custody necessitate
a Mirancfa waining. Under the Court analysis, since
tax investigations are often made in conte1nplation of
a criminal prosecution, the person under investigation
needs to be warned of his or her rights. Second, the
Court's decision 1nade it clear that a Miranda warning
is required to be given to a person in custody even
when, as here, the investigation is unconnected to the
reason why the person is in custody.
MARCEL GREEN
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MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
STANDARD IN FREE SPEECH CASES
The public concern standard has operated primarily
ll1 two categories of free-speech cases: those involving
speech by government employees and those involving defamation. In both, the public concern standard
limits the constitutional protection of speech. The
Supreme Court has held that government employee
speech must relate to a matter of public concern to be
protected from retaliation by employers (Pickering v.
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 1968).
If speech meets this threshold test of public concern, a balancing test is applied. If the interests of the
employer in providing efficient government outweigh
the employee's speech interests, the employer can
discipline the employee based on the speech. In defa1nation cases, the Court held in Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), that the
First Amendment is not implicated when the plaintiff
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claiming defamation is not a public figure and the
allegedly defamatory speech does not relate to a matter of public concern. Accordingly, the plaintiff
need not prove actual 1nalice to obtain da1nages
under state law.
Determining when speech is a matter of public
concern has not proved to be an easy task. Jn Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court indicated
that 1natters of public concern are those of "political,
social or other concern to the community." The content, form, and context of the speech will determi11e
whether it is protected, with content the most important factor. The manner, time, and place of delivery
are enco1npassed within this test. The speaker's
motive alone does not deterrnll1e whether speech is
protected, but may be a relevant factor.
The standard has been applied most frequently in
employee speech cases. In Connick, the Court concluded that speech that relates to an employee's personal grievance does not rise to the level of public
concern, even if it raises questions about the efficient
functioning of the government, for every employee
complaint is not a constitutional 1natter. But in Ran.kin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), the employee's
statement to a coworker about the attempted assassination of President Reagan that "if they go for him
again, I hope they get him" met the threshold. The
Court noted that the statement was in the context of
a discussion on the president's policies and just after
the attempt on his life. Additionally, the Comt indicated in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), that discrimination is
inherently a matter of public concern.
In the October 2005 term, in Garcetti v. Ceballos
(361 F.3d. 1168, 9th Cir. 2004, cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 1395, 2005), the Court considered whether an
employee's speech in the course of his job duties is
protected when it deals with a matter of public concern. The employer is arguing that such speech is
not protected; instead, the protection only inheres in
citizen speech by a government employee. If this argument prevails, some employee speech designed to
bring governmental wrongdoing to public light will
lose protection. Regardless of the outcome, the decision in this case will provide further guidance to the
lower courts, employers, and employees in determining what is protected employee speech and it may
modify the public concern requirement in government
employee speech cases.
ANN
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deported for acts that were legal at the time committed. These provisions caused President Harry
Truman to veto the act, stating that its lack of adequate judicial safeguards departed from the traditional A1nerican insistence on established standards of
guilt. Congress overwhelmingly overrode his veto,
and the McCarran-Walter Act set A1nerica's ll11111igration standards until 1965.
The act also provided for the denial of a visa of any
person who advocated Connnunism or the violent
overthrow of the U.S. government, while allowing
for a waiver under the attorney general's authority.
This section was used to exclude a number of foreign
intellectuals from touring the United States and
speaking or teaching at universities. It was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Kleindienst I'. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972), but was limited by amendments in 1977
and repealed in 1990, though restrictions re1nained on
travel from Cuba. A similar provision, allowing the
govern1nent to deny visas to those advocating or publicly endorsing terrorist activity, was enacted in the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
DANIEL LEVIN

McCARRAN-WALTER ACT OF 1952
The McCarran-Walter Act, formally known as the
Immigration and Nationality of Act of 1952, was a
comprehensive reworking of the nation's hn1nigration

laws. Passed at the height of the cold war, the law
reflected anxiety about the large numbers of refugees
from southern and eastern Europe who entered the
United States following World War II and their
possible connection to Soviet Con1munis1n. It also
ren1oved 1nany of the racial exclusions, prin1arily affecting Asians, of earlier innnigration laws. The act
prohibited immigration of any person found to be a
1nen1ber of a subversive organization by the attorney
general and allowed for the deportation of resident
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aliens who were, or had been, members of co1nmunist

McCARTHY, JOSEPH (1908-1957)

and "con1munist-front" organizations.
The McCarran-Walter Act built upon earlier prohibitions regarding radical aliens. U.S. inunigration
law had prohibited admission of anarchists since
1903, and the Smith Act of 1940 had allowed for
exclusion of members of organizations advocating
the violent overthrow of the government. The act
specifically allowed for the admission of a fonnerly
communist alien if that individual had been actively
opposed to Co=unism for at least five years or
had joined the Communist Party under threat or

A United States senator from Wisconsin, Joseph
McCarthy from 1950 to 1954 led a campaign against
co1111nunists in govern1nent that was routinely disdainful of civil liberties. He was so ruthless apd effective that the term "McCarthyism" was app!led to all
of his era's red-baiting and, more abstractly, to outbursts in later eras of rabid political labeling employing innuendo, assigning guilt by association, and lying
shamelessly.
McCarthy was born in Grand Chute, Wisconsin,
the son of devout Catholics who were struggling farmers. He received his early education in a one-room
schoolhouse and quit school at fourteen. However,
after unsuccessful ventures as a grocer and chicken
farmer, he returned to school at the age of twenty and
managed to complete four years of high school in only
one year. He then enrolled at Marquette University in

co1npulsion.

The McCarran-Walter Act provided for greater
ad1ninistrative discretion in exclusions and deportations and curtailed federal courts' ability to review
immigration decisions. All grounds for deportation
were n1ade retroactive, and noncitizens might be
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